Rational choice is not between science and common sense; it is a choice of both, of science to master the universal, and of common sense to deal with the particular. -Bernard Lonergan
There are several questions that motivated all the thinkers involved in the development of 20th century empiricism and philosophy of science that need to be stated explicitly. Often, these are the sorts of questions which, for everyone involved in the conversation, are presupposed and therefore, are never (or rarely) stated outright. And even if they … Continue reading The value of an empiricist account of mathematics
Previously, I discussed Ladyman and Ross's criticism of pseudo-scientific metaphysics. They have in mind versions of contemporary analytic metaphysics that rhetorically emulate science, but fail to engage science in any meaningful way. According to Ladyman and Ross, "taking naturalism seriously in metaphysics is equivalent to adopting a verificationist attitude towards both science and metaphysics" (1). … Continue reading Positivist vs. pragmatist verificationism
Improper method in metaphysics James Ladyman and Don Ross contrast their naturalized metaphysics with contemporary analytic metaphysics. They have a cluster of terms they use to refer to this misconceived form of metaphysics: a priori metaphysics, neo-scholastic metaphysics, and pseudo-scientific metaphysics. The common attribute towards which these designations point is a view that metaphysics investigates … Continue reading Pseudo-scientific and naturalized metaphysics
I have written of Ladyman and Ross's neopositivist commitments in terms of the separation of the context of discovery from the context of justification. Now, I want to deepen this assessment in light of Siegel's criticism of Quine. The separation hinges on the following question: where does the epistemological action take place? The neopositivists claim … Continue reading Scientific and extrascientific epistemology
In a previous post, I discussed the nature of the conflict between neopositivistic and naturalistic epistemology regarding the normative status of epistemology for science. Here, I present a compelling criticism of Quine's naturalized epistemology which suggests that shifting epistemology from philosophy to psychology does not accomplish everything Quine hoped it would. Quine's equivocation Harvey Siegel … Continue reading Quine was half right
W.V.O. Quine (left); Hans Reichenbach (right) James Ladyman and Don Ross are ambiguous about the role of epistemological justification in their endeavor to naturalize metaphysics. In my previous post, I cited the following passage from their text regarding the demarcation problem: We demarcate good science – around lines which are inevitably fuzzy near the boundary … Continue reading Is epistemology normative? Neopositivism vs naturalism
Why cognitive psychology? It might not be immediately apparent why my study of the philosophy of science devotes so much time and space to cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Why am I bothering with Iain McGilchrist, Jonathan Haidt, Daniel Kahneman, and Jordan Peterson? How, exactly, does the study of human cognition link up with philosophy of … Continue reading Cognitive psychology and the philosophy of science
Dissertating Outloud 