Tenets of logical positivism

Sometimes an author construes an idea, or list of ideas, so concisely that one cannot improve upon his formulation. This is the case for Stephen P. Schwartz’s list of basic tenets of logical positivism in A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy: From Russell to Rawls, so I’ll just borrow heavily from his work on this point. And, admittedly, I’m bored with logical positivism and want to move back to Quine’s and Ladyman’s naturalism as quickly as possible.

This is an excellent introduction to the major thinkers and arguments of analytic philosophy for unfamiliar academic and lay readers alike.

Schwartz’s list

Schwartz lists the following seven propositions as central tenets (according to A.J. Ayer’s standard interpretation) of logical positivism:

1. The elimination of metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, and theology by the verifiability criterion of meaningfulness.
2. The cause of metaphysical puzzlement is the superficial grammar of language; its cure is logical analysis.
3. Logic and mathematics consist of nothing but tautologies. These are formal truths that have no referential content.
4. All propositions that are necessary or a priori are tautologies. All propositions that are contingent or a posteriori are synthetic. Analytically true = tautologies = a priori = necessary. Synthetic = a posteriori = contingent. There are no synthetic a priori propositions.
5. All of science consists of a single unified system with a single set of natural laws and facts. There are no separate methods or systems in the psychological or social sciences.
6. Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities.
7. Ethical utterances have no cognitive content but are expressive of attitudes and emotions. (1)

Quine’s naturalistic critique of logical positivism is aimed primarily at 3, 4, and 5 from above. Schwartz captures the spirit of Quine’s critique nicely:

The problem with logical positivism was that it did not go far enough, that it was not true to its own empiricist ideals. It had too many remnants of the old ways of philosophy. Logical positivism was still infected with rationalism and metaphysics – the stuff it was trying to get rid of. The reliance on sense data theory, reductionism of one flavor or another, meanings, formal logic, and a rigidly applied principle of meaningfulness needed to be expunged or at least critically examined before the empiricism of the logical positivism could be self-respecting. Quine calls this project “tidying up empiricism.” It needed it. (2)

I think Quine’s argument that logical positivism did not go far enough also applies to Quine’s own naturalism, but saying precisely how will take the course of a dissertation to demonstrate. Though the general argument is stated here.

Notes:

1. Stephen P. Schwartz, A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy: From Russell to Rawls, p. 61-7.
2. ibid., p. 77-8.