Rational choice is not between science and common sense; it is a choice of both, of science to master the universal, and of common sense to deal with the particular. -Bernard Lonergan
This post completes a series of posts in on the nature and moments of insight. Nominal and explanatory definition Lonergan's sixth observation concerns different kinds of definition. To begin with, he has nominal and explanatory definition in mind. As Euclid defined a straight line as a line lying evenly between its extremes, so he might … Continue reading Insight: Definitions and primitive terms
I have read this section of Insight many times. Each time I’ve tried to summarize, restate, or rephrase it, but have failed each time. Perhaps it’s because the content is an exposition of an example. Whatever the cause, know that much of what follows quotes whole passages of Lonergan's text. My previous post introduced Lonergan's … Continue reading Defining a circle
I get the sense that I have finally identified where my argument will start. Of course, I've written a prospectus, spent years reading and loosely organizing notes, but my recent discovery of Robert Henman's work on the implications of Lonergan's Generalized Empirical Method for neuroscience has provided me with a case study of sorts that … Continue reading Insight is pivotal for epistemology
Elsewhere, I have argued that it is both necessary and sufficient to articulate a theory of knowing by analyzing the consciously transparent processes and operations of the knower. I want to deepen that argument by referring to Robert Henman's work, in which he makes the argument that a more robustly articulated theory of cognition (i.e. … Continue reading Neuroscience cannot dispense with conscious mental acts
Dissertating Outloud 