One of the central projects of Anglo-American philosophy was reducing, or translating, scientific statements into observation statements. Russell, (the early) Wittgenstein, Carnap, Hempel - they all sought to discover the logical connections between these seemingly related orders of description. However, not one of them was successful. But why should this be so difficult? What did … Continue reading One of analytic philosophy’s supreme failures
Category: Carl Hempel
Locating theoretical invariance
I've been posting long passages from Michael H. McCarthy's excellent analysis of 20th century epistemology, The Crisis of Philosophy. The following, guiding question has been in my mind as I read McCarthy's work: can one account for the dynamic nature of modern science through logical, systematic analysis alone? I believe the answer to this question is 'No'. I … Continue reading Locating theoretical invariance
Logical analysis as philosophical method
Ludwig Wittgenstein Previously I outlined what Stephen P. Schwartz takes to be the central tenets of logical positivism. Here I'll focus on the textual sources of logical analysis as a philosophical method. While not first chronologically, Hans Reichenbach's 1938 Experience and Prediction summarizes the intent of the logical positivist project concisely: It is the intention of uniting … Continue reading Logical analysis as philosophical method
Aristotle’s conception of science
Michael H. McCarthy's The Crisis of Philosophy has been an invaluable resource for me. I feel all-too-lucky to have obtained a discarded library copy from Amazon. McCarthy's book details philosophy's aimlessness and lack of purpose in the modern era as empirical science gathered to itself more and more of the territory traditionally held by the discipline of philosophy. … Continue reading Aristotle’s conception of science



