David Hume’s test of the Cartesian epistemological framework

David Hume This post follows upon this post. Hume's approach to philosophy was both more commonsensical than Descartes' and less physicalist than Hobbes'. Much like Descartes', Hume's philosophy begins with questions of cognition rather than being. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding was written primarily as a scrutiny of the operations of the mind. This endeavor … Continue reading David Hume’s test of the Cartesian epistemological framework →

Hume’s problem of induction

David Hume's problem of induction makes for an interesting case study in which to see the division between intellectualism and conceptualism play out. Below I state what Hume takes the problem to be. Elsewhere, I discuss Popper's conceptualist treatment of Hume's problem. The problem stated In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume examines the sources … Continue reading Hume’s problem of induction →

Insight: Definitions and primitive terms

This post completes a series of posts in on the nature and moments of insight. Nominal and explanatory definition Lonergan's sixth observation concerns different kinds of definition. To begin with, he has nominal and explanatory definition in mind. As Euclid defined a straight line as a line lying evenly between its extremes, so he might … Continue reading Insight: Definitions and primitive terms →

One of analytic philosophy’s supreme failures

One of the central projects of Anglo-American philosophy was reducing, or translating, scientific statements into observation statements. Russell, (the early) Wittgenstein, Carnap, Hempel - they all sought to discover the logical connections between these seemingly related orders of description. However, not one of them was successful. But why should this be so difficult? What did … Continue reading One of analytic philosophy’s supreme failures →

The human knower as subject

In a previous post, I referred to the distinction between regarding human knowers as subject or as object, along with the implications of this distinction for how we understand the relationship between commonsense and science. Here, I'd like to elaborate on what is meant by regarding the human knower as subject. Below is a sketch … Continue reading The human knower as subject →

Approaching commonsense and science

The centrality of humans as subjects to knowing I am a subject. You are a subject. We both view the world through a local instance of consciousness. That is our starting point. As a subject, I view the world as it relates to me. My ordinary, habitual, everyday experience requires me to solve a multitude … Continue reading Approaching commonsense and science →