One of the central projects of Anglo-American philosophy was reducing, or translating, scientific statements into observation statements. Russell, (the early) Wittgenstein, Carnap, Hempel - they all sought to discover the logical connections between these seemingly related orders of description. However, not one of them was successful. But why should this be so difficult? What did … Continue reading One of analytic philosophy’s supreme failures
Category: Epistemology
Approaching commonsense and science
The centrality of humans as subjects to knowing I am a subject. You are a subject. We both view the world through a local instance of consciousness. That is our starting point. As a subject, I view the world as it relates to me. My ordinary, habitual, everyday experience requires me to solve a multitude … Continue reading Approaching commonsense and science
Matrix of cognitive meaning
I am going to continue to record long, important passages from Michael H. McCarthy's The Crisis of Philosophy until I no longer need to do so. So there. Towards the beginning of his book, McCarthy introduces what he calls "The Matrix of Cognitive Meaning - An Orienting Map". This is meant to provide a series … Continue reading Matrix of cognitive meaning
Locating theoretical invariance
I've been posting long passages from Michael H. McCarthy's excellent analysis of 20th century epistemology, The Crisis of Philosophy. The following, guiding question has been in my mind as I read McCarthy's work: can one account for the dynamic nature of modern science through logical, systematic analysis alone? I believe the answer to this question is 'No'. I … Continue reading Locating theoretical invariance
Logical analysis as philosophical method
Ludwig Wittgenstein Previously I outlined what Stephen P. Schwartz takes to be the central tenets of logical positivism. Here I'll focus on the textual sources of logical analysis as a philosophical method. While not first chronologically, Hans Reichenbach's 1938 Experience and Prediction summarizes the intent of the logical positivist project concisely: It is the intention of uniting … Continue reading Logical analysis as philosophical method
Aristotle subverted
Let's continue with McCarthy's (and Lonergan's) distinction between classical and historical consciousness. In my last post, I quoted McCarthy at length on Aristotle's conception of science and how elements of that conception linger in the background of contemporary philosophy of science debates. Here, I'll quote McCarthy at length on the modern shift from Aristotle's classical … Continue reading Aristotle subverted
Aristotle’s conception of science
Michael H. McCarthy's The Crisis of Philosophy has been an invaluable resource for me. I feel all-too-lucky to have obtained a discarded library copy from Amazon. McCarthy's book details philosophy's aimlessness and lack of purpose in the modern era as empirical science gathered to itself more and more of the territory traditionally held by the discipline of philosophy. … Continue reading Aristotle’s conception of science
Discovery and Justification – An outline for research
What is relationship between epistemology and psychology? Frege and the logical positivists sharply distinguished epistemology from psychology. However, Quine's naturalized epistemology overturned this distinction, arguing that epistemology should become a chapter of psychology. This is a foundational question for epistemology. Following Frege, the logical positivists relegated the context of discovery to psychology and retained the … Continue reading Discovery and Justification – An outline for research
Psychologism – An outline for research
Gottlob Frege (left); Edmund Husserl (right) I'm at something of a standstill at the present moment. Writing a dissertation is a constant pivot between extremely detailed analysis and high-level organization. If I focus for too long on either aspect, I tend to lose sight of the other. Get too deep in the weeds, lose track … Continue reading Psychologism – An outline for research
Literature debate – Siegel v. Roth
I have not been able to write much in the last few weeks, but work continues in some form. Here's a debate in the secondary literature that I've read through, enjoyed, and will figure into the my work somewhere: Articles Harvey Siegel, "Justification, Discovery, and the Naturalizing of Epistemology," Philosophy of Science, Vol. 47. No. 2 (June … Continue reading Literature debate – Siegel v. Roth







