Rational choice is not between science and common sense; it is a choice of both, of science to master the universal, and of common sense to deal with the particular. -Bernard Lonergan
I have struggled for some time to find the thread that connects a number of divisions that I've brought up on this blog. For example, there is the division of the context of discovery from the context of justification. This anti-psychologistic position originates with Frege and is carried forward by Wittgenstein, the logical positivists, and … Continue reading Intellectualism or Conceptualism?
One of the central projects of Anglo-American philosophy was reducing, or translating, scientific statements into observation statements. Russell, (the early) Wittgenstein, Carnap, Hempel - they all sought to discover the logical connections between these seemingly related orders of description. However, not one of them was successful. But why should this be so difficult? What did … Continue reading One of analytic philosophy’s supreme failures
I am trying to flesh out the following argument at length: Aristotle mathematized science by modeling knowledge upon ancient geometrical reasoning. Much like Euclid's Elements after him, Aristotle envisioned knowledge as having an axiomatic-deductive structure. Granted, this was his description of a final, complete science rather than our contemporary, fallibilist conception of scientific inquiry, but … Continue reading Aristotle’s science according to J.L. Ackrill
I am going to continue to record long, important passages from Michael H. McCarthy's The Crisis of Philosophy until I no longer need to do so. So there. Towards the beginning of his book, McCarthy introduces what he calls "The Matrix of Cognitive Meaning - An Orienting Map". This is meant to provide a series … Continue reading Matrix of cognitive meaning
I've been posting long passages from Michael H. McCarthy's excellent analysis of 20th century epistemology, The Crisis of Philosophy. The following, guiding question has been in my mind as I read McCarthy's work: can one account for the dynamic nature of modern science through logical, systematic analysis alone? I believe the answer to this question is 'No'. I … Continue reading Locating theoretical invariance
Ludwig Wittgenstein Previously I outlined what Stephen P. Schwartz takes to be the central tenets of logical positivism. Here I'll focus on the textual sources of logical analysis as a philosophical method. While not first chronologically, Hans Reichenbach's 1938 Experience and Prediction summarizes the intent of the logical positivist project concisely: It is the intention of uniting … Continue reading Logical analysis as philosophical method
Gottlob Frege (left); Edmund Husserl (right) I'm at something of a standstill at the present moment. Writing a dissertation is a constant pivot between extremely detailed analysis and high-level organization. If I focus for too long on either aspect, I tend to lose sight of the other. Get too deep in the weeds, lose track … Continue reading Psychologism – An outline for research
Another motivating question for 20th century empiricism was the nature and status of Kant’s analytic/synthetic distinction. Frege, Russell, Whitehead, Wittgenstein, Carnap and others all accepted this distinction, though the significance of distinction changed over time. Famously, Quine rejected it and viewed analytic and synthetic statements as different in degree, but not in kind. In this … Continue reading The analytic/synthetic distinction
There are several questions that motivated all the thinkers involved in the development of 20th century empiricism and philosophy of science that need to be stated explicitly. Often, these are the sorts of questions which, for everyone involved in the conversation, are presupposed and therefore, are never (or rarely) stated outright. And even if they … Continue reading The value of an empiricist account of mathematics
Dissertating Outloud 