David Hume’s test of the Cartesian epistemological framework

David Hume This post follows upon this post. Hume's approach to philosophy was both more commonsensical than Descartes' and less physicalist than Hobbes'. Much like Descartes', Hume's philosophy begins with questions of cognition rather than being. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding was written primarily as a scrutiny of the operations of the mind. This endeavor … Continue reading David Hume’s test of the Cartesian epistemological framework →

Empiricist epistemology – Thomas Hobbes

Thomas Hobbes This post will make more sense if the reader reads this first. Empiricist epistemology Thomas Hobbes began several major works of political philosophy by first discussing the nature of sensation and its underlying significance for understanding political matters. Similarly, David Hume's An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding is simply that, an investigation of human … Continue reading Empiricist epistemology – Thomas Hobbes →

Cartesian epistemological method

From: http://www.unk.com/blog/the-hypnotic-art-of-confusion/ Through the epistemological turn, Descartes’ philosophical framework – his foundationalism, methodology, and philosophical assumptions – continues to influence and shape the contemporary philosophy of science. Cartesian epistemology is best known for its method of universal doubt. Dissatisfied with his own education, as well as with the state of academic and philosophical debate, Descartes … Continue reading Cartesian epistemological method →

Insight as mathematical development

Lonergan has shown us five features of an insight. The release of the tension of inquiryIts sudden and unexpected characterIts resulting from inner rather than outer conditionsThat it pivots between the concrete and abstractThat each new insight eventually becomes habitual Additionally, he has shown us how the various elements of an insight relate, resulting in … Continue reading Insight as mathematical development →

Insight: Definitions and primitive terms

This post completes a series of posts in on the nature and moments of insight. Nominal and explanatory definition Lonergan's sixth observation concerns different kinds of definition. To begin with, he has nominal and explanatory definition in mind. As Euclid defined a straight line as a line lying evenly between its extremes, so he might … Continue reading Insight: Definitions and primitive terms →

Aristotle’s science according to J.L. Ackrill

I am trying to flesh out the following argument at length: Aristotle mathematized science by modeling knowledge upon ancient geometrical reasoning. Much like Euclid's Elements after him, Aristotle envisioned knowledge as having an axiomatic-deductive structure. Granted, this was his description of a final, complete science rather than our contemporary, fallibilist conception of scientific inquiry, but … Continue reading Aristotle’s science according to J.L. Ackrill →

The analytic/synthetic distinction

Another motivating question for 20th century empiricism was the nature and status of Kant’s analytic/synthetic distinction. Frege, Russell, Whitehead, Wittgenstein, Carnap and others all accepted this distinction, though the significance of distinction changed over time. Famously, Quine rejected it and viewed analytic and synthetic statements as different in degree, but not in kind. In this … Continue reading The analytic/synthetic distinction →

The value of an empiricist account of mathematics

There are several questions that motivated all the thinkers involved in the development of 20th century empiricism and philosophy of science that need to be stated explicitly. Often, these are the sorts of questions which, for everyone involved in the conversation, are presupposed and therefore, are never (or rarely) stated outright. And even if they … Continue reading The value of an empiricist account of mathematics →