Descartes and the epistemological turn

Rene Descartes Traditional epistemology Epistemology is the area of philosophy that seeks to answer questions about our knowing, how that knowing is justified, and how grounds for justification are established. Epistemological naturalists often use the phrase traditional epistemology to describe the Cartesian tradition of philosophical inquiry, which began by asking epistemological questions prior to any … Continue reading Descartes and the epistemological turn →

Psychologism – An outline for research

Gottlob Frege (left); Edmund Husserl (right) I'm at something of a standstill at the present moment. Writing a dissertation is a constant pivot between extremely detailed analysis and high-level organization. If I focus for too long on either aspect, I tend to lose sight of the other. Get too deep in the weeds, lose track … Continue reading Psychologism – An outline for research →

Literature debate – Siegel v. Roth

I have not been able to write much in the last few weeks, but work continues in some form. Here's a debate in the secondary literature that I've read through, enjoyed, and will figure into the my work somewhere: Articles Harvey Siegel, "Justification, Discovery, and the Naturalizing of Epistemology," Philosophy of Science, Vol. 47. No. 2 (June … Continue reading Literature debate – Siegel v. Roth →

Positivist vs. pragmatist verificationism

Previously, I discussed Ladyman and Ross's criticism of pseudo-scientific metaphysics. They have in mind versions of contemporary analytic metaphysics that rhetorically emulate science, but fail to engage science in any meaningful way. According to Ladyman and Ross, "taking naturalism seriously in metaphysics is equivalent to adopting a verificationist attitude towards both science and metaphysics" (1). … Continue reading Positivist vs. pragmatist verificationism →

Pseudo-scientific and naturalized metaphysics

Improper method in metaphysics James Ladyman and Don Ross contrast their naturalized metaphysics with contemporary analytic metaphysics. They have a cluster of terms they use to refer to this misconceived form of metaphysics: a priori metaphysics, neo-scholastic metaphysics, and pseudo-scientific metaphysics. The common attribute towards which these designations point is a view that metaphysics investigates … Continue reading Pseudo-scientific and naturalized metaphysics →

Scientific and extrascientific epistemology

I have written of Ladyman and Ross's neopositivist commitments in terms of the separation of the context of discovery from the context of justification. Now, I want to deepen this assessment in light of Siegel's criticism of Quine. The separation hinges on the following question: where does the epistemological action take place? The neopositivists claim … Continue reading Scientific and extrascientific epistemology →

Quine was half right

In a previous post, I discussed the nature of the conflict between neopositivistic and naturalistic epistemology regarding the normative status of epistemology for science. Here, I present a compelling criticism of Quine's naturalized epistemology which suggests that shifting epistemology from philosophy to psychology does not accomplish everything Quine hoped it would. Quine's equivocation Harvey Siegel … Continue reading Quine was half right →

Is epistemology normative? Neopositivism vs naturalism

W.V.O. Quine (left); Hans Reichenbach (right) James Ladyman and Don Ross are ambiguous about the role of epistemological justification in their endeavor to naturalize metaphysics. In my previous post, I cited the following passage from their text regarding the demarcation problem: We demarcate good science – around lines which are inevitably fuzzy near the boundary … Continue reading Is epistemology normative? Neopositivism vs naturalism →