Positivist vs. pragmatist verificationism

Previously, I discussed Ladyman and Ross's criticism of pseudo-scientific metaphysics. They have in mind versions of contemporary analytic metaphysics that rhetorically emulate science, but fail to engage science in any meaningful way. According to Ladyman and Ross, "taking naturalism seriously in metaphysics is equivalent to adopting a verificationist attitude towards both science and metaphysics" (1). … Continue reading Positivist vs. pragmatist verificationism →

Scientific and extrascientific epistemology

I have written of Ladyman and Ross's neopositivist commitments in terms of the separation of the context of discovery from the context of justification. Now, I want to deepen this assessment in light of Siegel's criticism of Quine. The separation hinges on the following question: where does the epistemological action take place? The neopositivists claim … Continue reading Scientific and extrascientific epistemology →

Quine was half right

In a previous post, I discussed the nature of the conflict between neopositivistic and naturalistic epistemology regarding the normative status of epistemology for science. Here, I present a compelling criticism of Quine's naturalized epistemology which suggests that shifting epistemology from philosophy to psychology does not accomplish everything Quine hoped it would. Quine's equivocation Harvey Siegel … Continue reading Quine was half right →

Is epistemology normative? Neopositivism vs naturalism

W.V.O. Quine (left); Hans Reichenbach (right) James Ladyman and Don Ross are ambiguous about the role of epistemological justification in their endeavor to naturalize metaphysics. In my previous post, I cited the following passage from their text regarding the demarcation problem: We demarcate good science – around lines which are inevitably fuzzy near the boundary … Continue reading Is epistemology normative? Neopositivism vs naturalism →