David Hume's problem of induction makes for an interesting case study in which to see the division between intellectualism and conceptualism play out. Below I state what Hume takes the problem to be. Elsewhere, I discuss Popper's conceptualist treatment of Hume's problem. The problem stated In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume examines the sources … Continue reading Hume’s problem of induction
Category: Philosophy of Science
Intellectualism or Conceptualism?
I have struggled for some time to find the thread that connects a number of divisions that I've brought up on this blog. For example, there is the division of the context of discovery from the context of justification. This anti-psychologistic position originates with Frege and is carried forward by Wittgenstein, the logical positivists, and … Continue reading Intellectualism or Conceptualism?
Insight: Definitions and primitive terms
This post completes a series of posts in on the nature and moments of insight. Nominal and explanatory definition Lonergan's sixth observation concerns different kinds of definition. To begin with, he has nominal and explanatory definition in mind. As Euclid defined a straight line as a line lying evenly between its extremes, so he might … Continue reading Insight: Definitions and primitive terms
One of analytic philosophy’s supreme failures
One of the central projects of Anglo-American philosophy was reducing, or translating, scientific statements into observation statements. Russell, (the early) Wittgenstein, Carnap, Hempel - they all sought to discover the logical connections between these seemingly related orders of description. However, not one of them was successful. But why should this be so difficult? What did … Continue reading One of analytic philosophy’s supreme failures
Aristotle’s science according to J.L. Ackrill
I am trying to flesh out the following argument at length: Aristotle mathematized science by modeling knowledge upon ancient geometrical reasoning. Much like Euclid's Elements after him, Aristotle envisioned knowledge as having an axiomatic-deductive structure. Granted, this was his description of a final, complete science rather than our contemporary, fallibilist conception of scientific inquiry, but … Continue reading Aristotle’s science according to J.L. Ackrill
Matrix of cognitive meaning
I am going to continue to record long, important passages from Michael H. McCarthy's The Crisis of Philosophy until I no longer need to do so. So there. Towards the beginning of his book, McCarthy introduces what he calls "The Matrix of Cognitive Meaning - An Orienting Map". This is meant to provide a series … Continue reading Matrix of cognitive meaning
Locating theoretical invariance
I've been posting long passages from Michael H. McCarthy's excellent analysis of 20th century epistemology, The Crisis of Philosophy. The following, guiding question has been in my mind as I read McCarthy's work: can one account for the dynamic nature of modern science through logical, systematic analysis alone? I believe the answer to this question is 'No'. I … Continue reading Locating theoretical invariance
Logical analysis as philosophical method
Ludwig Wittgenstein Previously I outlined what Stephen P. Schwartz takes to be the central tenets of logical positivism. Here I'll focus on the textual sources of logical analysis as a philosophical method. While not first chronologically, Hans Reichenbach's 1938 Experience and Prediction summarizes the intent of the logical positivist project concisely: It is the intention of uniting … Continue reading Logical analysis as philosophical method
Aristotle subverted
Let's continue with McCarthy's (and Lonergan's) distinction between classical and historical consciousness. In my last post, I quoted McCarthy at length on Aristotle's conception of science and how elements of that conception linger in the background of contemporary philosophy of science debates. Here, I'll quote McCarthy at length on the modern shift from Aristotle's classical … Continue reading Aristotle subverted
Aristotle’s conception of science
Michael H. McCarthy's The Crisis of Philosophy has been an invaluable resource for me. I feel all-too-lucky to have obtained a discarded library copy from Amazon. McCarthy's book details philosophy's aimlessness and lack of purpose in the modern era as empirical science gathered to itself more and more of the territory traditionally held by the discipline of philosophy. … Continue reading Aristotle’s conception of science








