Discovery and Justification – An outline for research

What is relationship between epistemology and psychology? Frege and the logical positivists sharply distinguished epistemology from psychology. However, Quine's naturalized epistemology overturned this distinction, arguing that epistemology should become a chapter of psychology. This is a foundational question for epistemology. Following Frege, the logical positivists relegated the context of discovery to psychology and retained the … Continue reading Discovery and Justification – An outline for research →

Psychologism – An outline for research

Gottlob Frege (left); Edmund Husserl (right) I'm at something of a standstill at the present moment. Writing a dissertation is a constant pivot between extremely detailed analysis and high-level organization. If I focus for too long on either aspect, I tend to lose sight of the other. Get too deep in the weeds, lose track … Continue reading Psychologism – An outline for research →

Literature debate – Siegel v. Roth

I have not been able to write much in the last few weeks, but work continues in some form. Here's a debate in the secondary literature that I've read through, enjoyed, and will figure into the my work somewhere: Articles Harvey Siegel, "Justification, Discovery, and the Naturalizing of Epistemology," Philosophy of Science, Vol. 47. No. 2 (June … Continue reading Literature debate – Siegel v. Roth →

Tenets of logical positivism

Sometimes an author construes an idea, or list of ideas, so concisely that one cannot improve upon his formulation. This is the case for Stephen P. Schwartz's list of basic tenets of logical positivism in A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy: From Russell to Rawls, so I'll just borrow heavily from his work on this point. And, admittedly, I'm bored with logical positivism and … Continue reading Tenets of logical positivism →

The value of an empiricist account of mathematics

There are several questions that motivated all the thinkers involved in the development of 20th century empiricism and philosophy of science that need to be stated explicitly. Often, these are the sorts of questions which, for everyone involved in the conversation, are presupposed and therefore, are never (or rarely) stated outright. And even if they … Continue reading The value of an empiricist account of mathematics →

Positivist vs. pragmatist verificationism

Previously, I discussed Ladyman and Ross's criticism of pseudo-scientific metaphysics. They have in mind versions of contemporary analytic metaphysics that rhetorically emulate science, but fail to engage science in any meaningful way. According to Ladyman and Ross, "taking naturalism seriously in metaphysics is equivalent to adopting a verificationist attitude towards both science and metaphysics" (1). … Continue reading Positivist vs. pragmatist verificationism →

Pseudo-scientific and naturalized metaphysics

Improper method in metaphysics James Ladyman and Don Ross contrast their naturalized metaphysics with contemporary analytic metaphysics. They have a cluster of terms they use to refer to this misconceived form of metaphysics: a priori metaphysics, neo-scholastic metaphysics, and pseudo-scientific metaphysics. The common attribute towards which these designations point is a view that metaphysics investigates … Continue reading Pseudo-scientific and naturalized metaphysics →

Scientific and extrascientific epistemology

I have written of Ladyman and Ross's neopositivist commitments in terms of the separation of the context of discovery from the context of justification. Now, I want to deepen this assessment in light of Siegel's criticism of Quine. The separation hinges on the following question: where does the epistemological action take place? The neopositivists claim … Continue reading Scientific and extrascientific epistemology →

Quine was half right

In a previous post, I discussed the nature of the conflict between neopositivistic and naturalistic epistemology regarding the normative status of epistemology for science. Here, I present a compelling criticism of Quine's naturalized epistemology which suggests that shifting epistemology from philosophy to psychology does not accomplish everything Quine hoped it would. Quine's equivocation Harvey Siegel … Continue reading Quine was half right →

Is epistemology normative? Neopositivism vs naturalism

W.V.O. Quine (left); Hans Reichenbach (right) James Ladyman and Don Ross are ambiguous about the role of epistemological justification in their endeavor to naturalize metaphysics. In my previous post, I cited the following passage from their text regarding the demarcation problem: We demarcate good science – around lines which are inevitably fuzzy near the boundary … Continue reading Is epistemology normative? Neopositivism vs naturalism →