Rational choice is not between science and common sense; it is a choice of both, of science to master the universal, and of common sense to deal with the particular. -Bernard Lonergan
I have struggled for some time to find the thread that connects a number of divisions that I've brought up on this blog. For example, there is the division of the context of discovery from the context of justification. This anti-psychologistic position originates with Frege and is carried forward by Wittgenstein, the logical positivists, and … Continue reading Intellectualism or Conceptualism?
One of the central projects of Anglo-American philosophy was reducing, or translating, scientific statements into observation statements. Russell, (the early) Wittgenstein, Carnap, Hempel - they all sought to discover the logical connections between these seemingly related orders of description. However, not one of them was successful. But why should this be so difficult? What did … Continue reading One of analytic philosophy’s supreme failures
In a previous post, I referred to the distinction between regarding human knowers as subject or as object, along with the implications of this distinction for how we understand the relationship between commonsense and science. Here, I'd like to elaborate on what is meant by regarding the human knower as subject. Below is a sketch … Continue reading The human knower as subject
I am trying to flesh out the following argument at length: Aristotle mathematized science by modeling knowledge upon ancient geometrical reasoning. Much like Euclid's Elements after him, Aristotle envisioned knowledge as having an axiomatic-deductive structure. Granted, this was his description of a final, complete science rather than our contemporary, fallibilist conception of scientific inquiry, but … Continue reading Aristotle’s science according to J.L. Ackrill
I've been posting long passages from Michael H. McCarthy's excellent analysis of 20th century epistemology, The Crisis of Philosophy. The following, guiding question has been in my mind as I read McCarthy's work: can one account for the dynamic nature of modern science through logical, systematic analysis alone? I believe the answer to this question is 'No'. I … Continue reading Locating theoretical invariance
What is relationship between epistemology and psychology? Frege and the logical positivists sharply distinguished epistemology from psychology. However, Quine's naturalized epistemology overturned this distinction, arguing that epistemology should become a chapter of psychology. This is a foundational question for epistemology. Following Frege, the logical positivists relegated the context of discovery to psychology and retained the … Continue reading Discovery and Justification – An outline for research
Gottlob Frege (left); Edmund Husserl (right) I'm at something of a standstill at the present moment. Writing a dissertation is a constant pivot between extremely detailed analysis and high-level organization. If I focus for too long on either aspect, I tend to lose sight of the other. Get too deep in the weeds, lose track … Continue reading Psychologism – An outline for research
Dissertating Outloud 