Rational choice is not between science and common sense; it is a choice of both, of science to master the universal, and of common sense to deal with the particular. -Bernard Lonergan
Gottlob Frege (left); Edmund Husserl (right) I'm at something of a standstill at the present moment. Writing a dissertation is a constant pivot between extremely detailed analysis and high-level organization. If I focus for too long on either aspect, I tend to lose sight of the other. Get too deep in the weeds, lose track … Continue reading Psychologism – An outline for research
Sometimes an author construes an idea, or list of ideas, so concisely that one cannot improve upon his formulation. This is the case for Stephen P. Schwartz's list of basic tenets of logical positivism in A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy: From Russell to Rawls, so I'll just borrow heavily from his work on this point. And, admittedly, I'm bored with logical positivism and … Continue reading Tenets of logical positivism
Another motivating question for 20th century empiricism was the nature and status of Kant’s analytic/synthetic distinction. Frege, Russell, Whitehead, Wittgenstein, Carnap and others all accepted this distinction, though the significance of distinction changed over time. Famously, Quine rejected it and viewed analytic and synthetic statements as different in degree, but not in kind. In this … Continue reading The analytic/synthetic distinction
Previously, I discussed Ladyman and Ross's criticism of pseudo-scientific metaphysics. They have in mind versions of contemporary analytic metaphysics that rhetorically emulate science, but fail to engage science in any meaningful way. According to Ladyman and Ross, "taking naturalism seriously in metaphysics is equivalent to adopting a verificationist attitude towards both science and metaphysics" (1). … Continue reading Positivist vs. pragmatist verificationism
I have written of Ladyman and Ross's neopositivist commitments in terms of the separation of the context of discovery from the context of justification. Now, I want to deepen this assessment in light of Siegel's criticism of Quine. The separation hinges on the following question: where does the epistemological action take place? The neopositivists claim … Continue reading Scientific and extrascientific epistemology
In a previous post, I discussed the nature of the conflict between neopositivistic and naturalistic epistemology regarding the normative status of epistemology for science. Here, I present a compelling criticism of Quine's naturalized epistemology which suggests that shifting epistemology from philosophy to psychology does not accomplish everything Quine hoped it would. Quine's equivocation Harvey Siegel … Continue reading Quine was half right
W.V.O. Quine (left); Hans Reichenbach (right) James Ladyman and Don Ross are ambiguous about the role of epistemological justification in their endeavor to naturalize metaphysics. In my previous post, I cited the following passage from their text regarding the demarcation problem: We demarcate good science – around lines which are inevitably fuzzy near the boundary … Continue reading Is epistemology normative? Neopositivism vs naturalism
Dissertating Outloud 