Rational choice is not between science and common sense; it is a choice of both, of science to master the universal, and of common sense to deal with the particular. -Bernard Lonergan
I have read this section of Insight many times. Each time I’ve tried to summarize, restate, or rephrase it, but have failed each time. Perhaps it’s because the content is an exposition of an example. Whatever the cause, know that much of what follows quotes whole passages of Lonergan's text. My previous post introduced Lonergan's … Continue reading Defining a circle
I get the sense that I have finally identified where my argument will start. Of course, I've written a prospectus, spent years reading and loosely organizing notes, but my recent discovery of Robert Henman's work on the implications of Lonergan's Generalized Empirical Method for neuroscience has provided me with a case study of sorts that … Continue reading Insight is pivotal for epistemology
Elsewhere, I have argued that it is both necessary and sufficient to articulate a theory of knowing by analyzing the consciously transparent processes and operations of the knower. I want to deepen that argument by referring to Robert Henman's work, in which he makes the argument that a more robustly articulated theory of cognition (i.e. … Continue reading Neuroscience cannot dispense with conscious mental acts
One of the central projects of Anglo-American philosophy was reducing, or translating, scientific statements into observation statements. Russell, (the early) Wittgenstein, Carnap, Hempel - they all sought to discover the logical connections between these seemingly related orders of description. However, not one of them was successful. But why should this be so difficult? What did … Continue reading One of analytic philosophy’s supreme failures
In a previous post, I referred to the distinction between regarding human knowers as subject or as object, along with the implications of this distinction for how we understand the relationship between commonsense and science. Here, I'd like to elaborate on what is meant by regarding the human knower as subject. Below is a sketch … Continue reading The human knower as subject
The centrality of humans as subjects to knowing I am a subject. You are a subject. We both view the world through a local instance of consciousness. That is our starting point. As a subject, I view the world as it relates to me. My ordinary, habitual, everyday experience requires me to solve a multitude … Continue reading Approaching commonsense and science
I am trying to flesh out the following argument at length: Aristotle mathematized science by modeling knowledge upon ancient geometrical reasoning. Much like Euclid's Elements after him, Aristotle envisioned knowledge as having an axiomatic-deductive structure. Granted, this was his description of a final, complete science rather than our contemporary, fallibilist conception of scientific inquiry, but … Continue reading Aristotle’s science according to J.L. Ackrill
I am going to continue to record long, important passages from Michael H. McCarthy's The Crisis of Philosophy until I no longer need to do so. So there. Towards the beginning of his book, McCarthy introduces what he calls "The Matrix of Cognitive Meaning - An Orienting Map". This is meant to provide a series … Continue reading Matrix of cognitive meaning
I've been posting long passages from Michael H. McCarthy's excellent analysis of 20th century epistemology, The Crisis of Philosophy. The following, guiding question has been in my mind as I read McCarthy's work: can one account for the dynamic nature of modern science through logical, systematic analysis alone? I believe the answer to this question is 'No'. I … Continue reading Locating theoretical invariance
Ludwig Wittgenstein Previously I outlined what Stephen P. Schwartz takes to be the central tenets of logical positivism. Here I'll focus on the textual sources of logical analysis as a philosophical method. While not first chronologically, Hans Reichenbach's 1938 Experience and Prediction summarizes the intent of the logical positivist project concisely: It is the intention of uniting … Continue reading Logical analysis as philosophical method
Dissertating Outloud 